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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
KENNETH W. GIBB, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
EARL N. DORIUS, Director, Driver 
License Division, State of Utah, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This appeal concerns legality of the driver's license 
revocation by the appellant under Utah's Implied Con-
sent Law, Section 41-6-44.10 U. C. A., as amended. 
DISPOSITION BELOW 
On October 8, 1973, the appellant revoked respon-
dent's driver's license to drive for the laitter's alleged 
failure to submit to a sobriety test under Section 41-6-
44.10, U. C. A., as amended. Pursant to the provisions of 
said act, respondent timely sought a trial de novo in the 
Ctoe No. 
13626 
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District Court of Salt Lake County, for a determination 
of whether respondent's license was subject to revocation. 
The case was heard before the Honorable D. Frank Wil-
kins on the 18th day of December, 1973. Judge Wilkins 
found that the state failed to prove that the order en-
tered on the 8th day of October, 1973, was lawful and not 
in excess of appellant's authority and jurisdiction; fur-
ther, that the respondent had a right to rely upon repre-
sentations made by the arresting officer that he had a 
right to counsel, and that the arresting officer was in 
error, after informing respondent of this right, but re-
fusing to allow him to obtain such counsel prior to re-
questing that he either submit or refuse a chemical test 
for sobriety. Further, that the question of respondent's 
refusal to submit to a chemical test was moot in light of 
the fact that the state failed to provide a duly authorized 
laboratory technician as required in Section 41-6-44.10 (f) 
U. C. A. (1963), as amended. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appelant seeks a reversal of the lower court's judg-
ment findings of fact and conclusions of law granting 
a return of the respondent's driver's license and seeks 
an order in harmony with the appellant's order of revo-
cation. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent is obligated to set forth a concise state-
ment of the material facts of this case because appellant 
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has failed to set forth in his brief any facts relevant to 
respondent's position or any facts upon which the lower 
court based its decision. Respondent agrees that on May 
17, 1973 at approximately 4:01 A.M. he was arrested by 
Trooper Wayne Smith and was asked to submit to a 
chemical test to determine the amount of alcohol in his 
blood. Respondent agrees that he had no preference 
as to the type of chemical test but contends that it was 
the officer's preference and desire that he submit to a 
blood test (R. 18). Respondent agrees that Trooper 
Smith then called the dispatcher to notify a technician 
for the purpose of drawing blood upon their arrival at 
the County jail. The respondent agrees that he was 
stopped at 4:01 A.M. on May 17, 1973. That he was 
placed under arrest at 4:04 A.M., that he was advised 
of bis rights at 4:09 A.M. 
Respondent agrees thereafter, Trooper Smith and 
another highway patrolman proceeded to the Salt Lake 
City and County jail. Respondent agrees that a discus-
sion was had in regard to the implied consent law. Re-
spondent agrees that he asked to speak to an attorney 
and he was provided a telephone and permitted to make 
several telephone calls until he contacted the undersigned 
counsel. Respondent agrees that Trooper Smith talked 
to his attorney and that the Trooper asked that the 
respondent submit to a chemical test but only requested 
that be submit to a blood test (R. 18). Respondent 
agrees that respondent's counsel informed Trooper Smith 
that he would not refuse the test but that he could not 
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fully advise Mr. Gibb over the telephone. Respondent 
agrees that Trooper Smith requested that he get an an-
swer as to whether Mir. Gibb would take the chemical 
test, a blood test. Respondent does not agree that these 
activities took place between 4:45 A.M. and 5:30 A.M., 
but contends that they took place from 4:50 A.M. to 
5:20 A.M., and that Trooper Smith turned the respon-
dent over for booking by the jailer at 5:25 A.M. (R. 29). 
Respondent contends that he had a short conversation 
and not a long conversation with his attorney and that 
Trooper Smith really could not recall the exact time and 
was quite foggy on the sequency of facts (R. 29, 30). 
Respondent agrees that Trooper Smith was informed that 
respondent's counsel could not advise Mr. Gibb over the 
phone due to the lack of privacy; that he was coming to 
the jail to speak to Mr. Gibb in private. Respondent's 
counsel informed Trooper Smith that in the opinion of 
respondent's counsel, a telephone call with the trooper, 
the technician and other jail employees standing next to 
the defendant, did not permit adequate privacy; there-
fore it necessitated a trip to the jail so that he could 
speak in private with his client. Respondent further 
contends that Trooper Smith was informed by the re-
spondent's counsel that he would be there in a few min-
utes and that his counsel arrived at 5:25 A.M. (R. 30). 
Respondent agrees that in cross-examination, Mr. Lynn 
Davis staited his qualifications as a chemist and stated 
that he was employed by the City-County Health De-
partment, however, respondent contends that Mr. Davis 
failed to give any testimony to show that he was a duly 
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authorized laboratory technician as is required under 
Section 41-6-44.10 (f) (R. 13), or that he was even a 
laboratory technician (R. 5, 6, 11, 12, 13). Respondent 
contends that Mr. Davis' testimony primarily established 
the foundation that would be necessary to give testimony 
regarding the actual analysis of a sample but gave no 
testimony showing his qualifications or authorization to 
draw said sample (R. 5, 6, 11, 12, 13). Respondent con-
tends that Mr. Davis testimony stated the only authori-
zation which he had was an implied authorization due 
to the fact that the State Division of Health, a depart-
ment unrelated to the department charged with the ad-
ministration of Section 41-6-44.10 monitored his proced-
ure in analyzing blood alcohol and "running Wood alco-
hol tests" (R, 12). Respondent contends that Mr. Davis 
failed to give any testimony to indicate that he was 
authorized to withdraw bbod alcohol samples, pursuant 
to 44-6-44.10 (f) (R. 12). That the lower court's decision 
should be affirmed for the following reasons: 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE LOWER COURT'S DETERMINATION 
THAT MR. LYNN DAVIS WAS NOT A 
"DULY AUTHORIZED L A B O R A T O R Y 
TECHNICHIAN" THEREFORE RENDER-
ING THE QUESTION OF RESPONDENTS 
REFUSAL TO GRANT A BLOOD ALCOHOL 
SAMPLE MOOT, FINDS SUBSTANTIAL 
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SUPPORT IN THE EVIDENCE AND THE 
LAW. 
Under Section 41-6-44.10(a), U. C. A., as amended, 
the District Court in a trial de novo was vested with 
jurisdiction "to take testimony and examine into the facts 
of the case and to determine whether . . . [respondent] 
license is subject to revocation . . .". 
The appellant had to demonstrate by a preponder-
ance of the evidence that respondent had refused to take 
the sobriety test requested because this was the basis 
upon which appellant revoked the respondent's license. 
This determination admittedly is a question of fact 
within the providence of the trier of fact. Apparent in 
the opinion of the lower court, the appellant failed to 
meet the burden of proof required and the evidence indi-
cated that respondent did consent to the taking of his 
blood test. 
This court has long held it is the prerogative of the 
trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses in 
in applying the facts; that the court reviews evidence in 
the light most favorable to the trial judge and that the 
trial judge's finding will not be disturbed if there is 
reasonable basis in the evidence to sustain them. E.g., 
Bramel v. Utah State Road Commission, 24 Utah 2d 50, 
465 P. 2d 534, 535 (1970). Seegmiller v. Western Men, 
Inc., 20 Utah 2d 352, 354, 427 P. 2d 892, 894 (1968). 
Marks v. Continental Casualty Co., 19 Utah 2d 119, 123-
24, 427 P. 2d 387, 390 (1967). 
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In the instant case there is reasonable basis in the 
evidence to sustain the trial court's findings. 
It cannot be denied that respondent consented to 
submit to a blood test at the first request of Trooper 
Smith (R. 18), and never refused (R. 30). Subsequent 
to the respondent's consent to giving a blood sample for 
the purpose of determining the blood alcohol level, it was 
Trooper Smith's obligation to administer the test accord-
ing to law. Trooper Smith requested that the respondent 
take a blood test and radioed the dispatcher at the Salt 
Lake City and County jail to have a technician meet 
them (R. 18). 
Section 41-6-44.10 (f) provides: 
"Only a physician, registered nurse, practical 
nurse, or duly authorized laboratory technician 
acting at the request of a police officer can with-
draw blood for the purpose of determining the 
alcoholic or drug content therein." (Emphasis 
added.) 
The lower court found as a question of fact and law 
that Mr. Davis was not a duly authorized laboratory 
technician. 
The appellant argues that the correct interpretation 
or reading of Section 41-6-44.10 (f) would be "to read 
the section as a whole", and ignore the words "duly 
authorized" (A. 12). 
To do this would be to determine that the words 
"duly authorized" have no substantive meaning and are 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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present in the statute strictly as a matter of foorm. This 
is contrary to the holding of this court, the doctrine of 
ejusdem generis and expressio unius est exdusio alterius. 
The appellant concedes that "duly" has substantive 
meaning and in fact cites two cases in his brief holding 
to that effect (A. 19). 
In General Talking Pictures Corp. v. Hyatt, Justice 
Wolfe said: 
"The word 'duly' has acquired a fixed legal 
meaning, and when used before any word im-
plying action, it means that the act was done 
properly. It does not relate to form merely, but 
includes form and substance, implying the ex-
istence that every fact essential to perfect regu-
larity of procedure in the observance of statu-
tory requirements; and has been defined gen-
erally as meaning according to law, or some rule 
of law, or practice, * * * by proper proced-
ure * * * properly, regularly, sufficiently." 
114 Utah 362, 366, 199 P. 2d 147, 148 (1948). 
Further, it must be assumed that each term of the 
statute was used advisably and should be interpreted 
and applied in light of its accepted or established mean-
ing. Grant v. Utah State Landboardy 26 Utah 2d 100, 
485 P. 2d 1035, 1036 (1971). 
It is an axiomatic rule that every law should be con-
strued in a light that will give effect to all of its provi-
sions. State v. Gates, 118 Utah 182, 187, 221 P. 2d 878, 
880 (1950). In a specific statute the words "duly" and 
"authorized" must be given meaning, and it should be 
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construed in a manner that will render the words oper-
ative rather than to make them idle and nugatory Stev-
enson v. Salt Lake City Corp., 7 Utah 2d 28, 30, 317 P. 
2d 597 (1957). This court has long held that in inter-
preting statutes, an attempt should be made to give every 
word effect. Maw v. Lee, 108 Utah 99, 107, 157 P. 2d 
585, 588 (1945). 
It is obvious that the legislature did not intend to 
include all laboratory technicians. Rio Grande Motorway, 
Ine v. Public Service Commission, 21 Utah 2d 377, 380, 
445 P. 2d 990 (1968). This is the only interpretation that 
would be consistent in light of the specific individuals 
mentioned earlier in this sentence (physicians, registered 
nurses, practical nurses) and would be the only inter-
pretation consistent with the doctrine of ejusdem generis 
which this court has prescribed in numerous cases. E.g. 
Lark v. Whitehead, 28 Utah 2d 343, 345, 504 P. 2d 557, 
559 (1972), Townsend v. Board of Review of Industrial 
Commission, 27 Utah 2d 94, 96, 493 P. 2d 614, 616 (1972), 
Heathman v. Giles, 13 Utah 2d 368, 370, 374 P. 2d 839, 
840 (1962), Stone v. Salt Lake City, 11 Utah 2d 196, 204, 
356 P. 2d 631, 636 (1960). 
Mr. Davis was called to the Salt Lake City and 
County jail at the request of Trooper Wayne Smith and 
testified that he was an employee of the Salt Lake City 
and County Health Department and that his position 
was a chemist (R. 5). He stated that he had a certificate 
as a medical technologist from the United States Navy 
during World War II and he had a bachelor of arts de-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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gree with a composite major in Bacteriology and Chem-
istry and approximately twenty-five years experience in 
clinical laboratory work (R. 6). On cross-examination, 
he admitted that he had never received specific authori-
zation to function as a duly authorized laboratory tech-
nician in drawing blood samples pursuant to Section 
41-6-44.10 (f) (R. 13). The trial court then determined 
that Mr. Davis was not a duly authorized laboratory 
technician as is required by the statute and that the 
question of Mr. Gibb's refusing to permit Mr. Davis to 
take a blood sample was moot in light of this fact. This 
is the prerogative of the trier of fact. Thomson v. Condas9 
27 Utah 2d 129, 130, 493 P. 2d 639, 640 (1972). 
Upon a reading of the statute, it is apparent that 
the legislature placed a requirement that any laboratory 
technician who wished to perform the act of withdrawing 
blood samples from a suspect, be duly authorized. There 
is good reason for this and a strong public policy in sup-
port of it. Appellant concedes (A. 12) that laboraitory 
technicians are not licensed by the State of Utah. There-
fore it is difficult to ascertain the minimum level of 
competency for a laboratory technician without some 
regulatory standard which sets a minimum level of com-
petency such as is applied to physicians, nurses, and 
practical nurses. Consequently, the legislature within 
its power to provide for the general welfare and to secure 
its citizens against the consequences of ignorance and 
incompetency, placed a requirement in the statute that 
the laboratory technician be duly authorized to perform 
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the tests. The power to promulgate procedures to bring 
about this authorization is provided in Section 41-1-3, 
U. C. A. (1953). Section 41-6-44.10, U. C. A., as amended, 
is a law the cx>mmission is charged with enforcement of. 
Further Section 41-6-1 provides: 
"The following words and phrases when used in 
this act shall, for the purpose of this act, have 
the meanings respectively ascribed to them" 
The appellant has extensively briefed the subject of 
agency by implication and agency by estoppel. I feel 
this is irrelevant for two reasons: (1) All of the cases 
deal with an individual innocent third party who is ap-
plying the doctrine of agency to prevent an injustice 
after there had been a clear and apparent holding forth 
in previous dealings; (2) The doctrine of agency by im-
plication is not an acceptable doctrine to be applied 
against the State of Utah in light of its sovereign im-
munity. See Section 63-30-1 U. C. A., (1953), as 
amended, et seq. of the Governmental Immunity Act. 
Further, it is pure speculation on the part of the appel-
lant to contend that Trooper Smith could have, had we 
raised the objetcion early in the proceedings as to Mr. 
Davis' qualifications, administered a breathalizer test 
to Mr. Gibb. Trooper Smith and Mr. Davis admitted 
that they left the Salt Lake City and County jail com-
plex prior to the arrival of respondent's counsel. Further, 
the question of whidh test Trooper Smith could have 
administered was decided by him when he requested Mr. 
Gibb to submit to a blood test (R. 18). The decision was 
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Trooper Smith's decision by statute and not Mr. Gibb's 
but where he requested Mr. Gibb to submit to one test 
he cannot now be permitted to say that another test 
could have been given to avoid this problem. 
The lower court <x>mmitted no error in light of the 
facts and testimonies, and the lower court's decision 
should be affirmed and this appeal dismissed. 
POINT II. 
AS A MATTER OF LAW RESPONDENT 
WAS NOT AFFORDED HIS RIGHT TO 
COUNSEL. 
Appellant has misconstrued the holding of the court. 
Nowhere in the findings of fact and conclusions of law 
did the court hold respondent had a right to have his 
counsel physically present in the county jail prior to the 
taking of the blood test. The court did hold, that based 
upon the facts, the respondent was not afforded the right 
to fully consult counsel and be properly advised of his 
rights. The appellant concedes that the respondent had 
the right to counsel. In fact, Trooper Smith informed 
him of this fact and permitted him to contact an attorney. 
The issue in the lower court was whether or not a tele-
phone call under the facts and circumstances in this 
particular case sufficiently constituted respondent's right 
to counsel. It appears in the record, that respondent could 
not converse freely with his counsel due to the presence 
of Trooper Smith and Mr. Davis (R. 10, 33). Respon-
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dent concedes that this matter is not a criminal matter 
and the right to counsel should not be treated as a tech-
nicality, the denial of which would totally vitiate the 
proceedings. However, respondent contends that based 
on -the facts present in this case it would not have been 
unreasonable or burdensome to permit the respondent 
the right to privately speak to his attorney prior to mak-
ing his decision to submit to a chemical test. Respon-
dent submits this issue should be decided by weighing 
the strong public policy established by this court, that 
the accused should be afforded the right to counsel at 
the earliest possible moment; if the exercise of this right 
is not unreasonable, burdensome or delaying. State v. 
Hamilton, 18 Utah 2d 234, 238, 419 P. 2d 770, 774 (1966). 
The trial court, based upon facts presented, deter-
mined that it would not have been unreasonable or bur-
densome for Trooper Smith to have afforded the respon-
dent this right. It is our contention, that the period of 
time that Trooper Smith would have waited for respon-
dent's counsel to reach the jail and converse with re-
spondent privately, was only a matter of minutes. There-
fore, Trooper Smith was totally unreasonable in filling 
out the refusal and leaving the jail after being specifically 
informed by respondent's counsel, twice, that he would 
be there shortly. 
The record indicates that respondent's counsel ar-
rived at the Salt Lake City and County jail at 5:25 A.M. 
Trooper Smith insisted that he was still at the jail at 
that time. Further, the record indicates that the respon-
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dent's counsel requested to see the respondent and was 
not permitted to do so. 
The accused has a right to counsel at the earliest 
time practical, since it is his means of knowing what his 
other rights are. State v. Hamilton, 18 Utah 2d 234, 238, 
410 P. 2d 770, 774 (1966). Although the accused driver 
has given his consent to a chemical test, by being granted 
the privilege to drive, he has the right to be advised by 
counsel as to the implication of his compliance or refusal 
with said consent. Hunter v. Darius, 23 Utah 2d 122, 123, 
458 P. 2d 877, 879. Further, in light of the stiff penalty 
attached to a refusal, the respondent should be afforded, 
if it would not cause an unreasonable delay, every oppor-
tunity to consider and be informed by counsel. 
The respondent was stopped at 4:01 A.M. and not 
delivered to the Salt Lake City and County jail until 
4:55 A.M., some 55 miautes later. Trooper Smith stated 
that Mr. Davis was not at the jail at the time they ar-
rived, and that Mr. Davis arrived later (R. 20). The 
record would show where Mr. Gibb was stopped is only 
five minutes from the jail. It would not have been an 
unreasonable or unjustified delay for the officer to have 
waited until 5:25 A.M. to submit the respondent to a 
chemical test, or even 5:30 A.M. He had initially waited 
51 minutes to bring the respondent to the City and 
County jail and he gave no reason for this delay. The 
chemical test would still have been probative and the 
small additional delay would not have been unjustified. 
Trooper Smith gave the reason he had to leave and could 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
15 
not wait, was due to the fact that there were only two 
cars on duty that night and itihat he had brought the 
other officer with him to the jail (R. 24). However, he 
stated that Mr. Gibb at no time during the period of 
custody was hostile or dangerous (R. 34), and that Offi-
cer Tenny could have taken his oar and returned to patrol 
(R. 34). 
Consequently, there is sufficient evidence in the rec-
ord to warmnt a finding that the respondent's conduct 
was not a refusal within the meaning of Section 41-6-
44.10(c), U. C. A., (1953), as amended, but was an ex-
ercise of this right to counsel without causing unreason-
able delay or burden. Therefore, because there is reason-
able basis in the evidence to support the lower court's 
decision, the decision of that court should be affirmed. 
POINT III. 
WHAT CONSTITUTES "REFUSAL TO CON-
SENT TO A CHEMICAL TEST" PURSUANT 
TO 41-6-44.10(c), UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 
AS AMENDED, IS A FACT QUESTION TO 
BE DETERMINED BY THE TRIAL COURT. 
The consideration of credibility of witnesses and the 
weight accorded to their respective testimony is a ques-
tion of fact within the prerogative of the trial court. 
Section 41-6-44.10 (c), Utah Code Annotated 
(1953), as amended, provides . . . if at said hear-
ing the department determinas that the person 
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was granted the right to submit to a chemical 
test and without reasonable cause refused to sub-
mi t . . . (emphasis added). 
Respondent contends that he was not granted the 
righlt to submit to a chemical test as is provided in 41-
6-44.10 (f) and that he had a reasonable cause to request 
(time to consult with counsel in light of the fact that it 
would only have required waiting five to ten minutes 
longer (R. 29). Reasonable cause can be termed synony-
mous with reasonable excuse. Ballentine's Law Diction-
ary, Third Edition, 1060, 1061. 
During the trial de novo, in the lower court, the 
Judge heard testimony from Mr. Davis, Trooper Smith 
and Mr. Reagan, respondent's counsel. 
Appellant contends Mr. Gibb's statement that he 
would not submit to a chemical test until his attorney 
arrived, constituted a refusal. The lower court, after 
hearing the facts and analyizing the circumstances, found 
that Mr. Gibb's actions as a question of fact did not con-
stitute a refusal. This court has long held, "[It should be] 
assumed that [the fact finder] believed those aspects 
of evidence, and drew such inference as faidy could be 
drawn therefrom, favorable to his findings and judgment." 
People Finance and Thrift Co. v. Landis, 28 Utah 2d 
392, 395, 503 P. 2d 444, 445 (1972). 
Further the trial court's findings and conclusions 
are presumed valid and it is the appellant's obligation 
to show error. Latimer v. Katz, 29 Uteh 2d 280, 283, 508 
P. 2d 542, 545 (1973). 
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CONCLUSION 
Respondent respectfully requests that lor the rea-
sons above stated that the lower court's decision should 
be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
WILLIAM K. REAGAN 
1550 South West Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
Attorney for Respondent 
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